Solutions for Japan's economic problems: Implications for U.S.-Japan relations by unknown
From business leaders to the everyday tourist, everyone seems to wonder about the
same thing about Japan: When will the economy finally get better? It’s been more
than a decade since this debate began, and although there are always sparks of
promising economic figures here and there, in the end, the conclusion is that more
can be done. 
That said, the Japanese economy bounced higher without fiscal stimulus last year,
and many experts were quick to tout that all the painful structural reforms imple-
mented over the past decade had finally paid off. But has it really? 
On June 21, 2004, the Center on Japanese Economy and Business of Columbia
University and the Research Center for Advanced Science and Technology of the
University of Tokyo gathered academics, business leaders, and public officials 
in Tokyo to discuss the merits and mistakes of past, present, and future economic
policies by the government and the Bank of Japan (for a copy of that report, 
please visit http://www-1.gsb.columbia.edu/japan).
The CJEB organized a supplementary follow-up symposium in New York on
November 19, 2004, in conjunction with the Japan Society for the purpose of 
presenting the project’s research results to a U.S. audience. 
Presenters included Takatoshi Ito, Professor at the Graduate School of Economics
and Research Center for Advanced Science and Technology, University of Tokyo;
David Weinstein, Carl S. Shoup Professor of the Japanese Economy, Department of
Economics, Columbia University; Anil Kashyap, Edward Eagle Brown Professor of
Economics and Finance, University of Chicago; Kenneth Kuttner, Danforth-Lewis
Professor of Economics, Oberlin College; and Hugh Patrick, Director, Center on
Japanese Economy and Business, and R. D. Calkins Professor of International
Business Emeritus, Columbia Business School. Many of the speaker presentations
made in New York were the same as those given in Tokyo, with the exception of
Kenneth Kuttner’s. This report highlights Professor Kuttner’s presentation, along
with discussions and question and answer sessions during the symposium.
Additional support was provided by the Itoh Foundation, U.S.A., and the
Japan–United States Friendship Commission. 
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Keynote speaker Kakutaro Kitashiro, Chairmanof the Japan Association of Corporate
Executives (Keizai Doyukai), noted his optimism
about the Japanese economy, while emphasizing
the need for additional structural changes that
would help keep the entrepreneurial flame alive.
“Entrepreneurship has to be instilled in the educa-
tional system. Of course, scholastic achievement
is very important, but at the same time, starting a
business is admirable, which students need to
know,” he said. “The year 2004 is the new dawn of
the Japanese economy. It is about to rebound, and
innovation is the key to growth. We should not pro-
crastinate. This should be the year for decision
and action.”
During discussions about macroeconomic pol-
icy, Takatoshi Ito from the University of Tokyo
recommended that since Japan was still in a defla-
tionary malaise, the Bank of Japan should adopt a
price-level policy and then eventually adopt an infla-
tion-target policy to “promote confidence in the
market.” David Weinstein of Columbia University
noted that Japan’s debt-to-GDP ratio was nothing to
panic about over the long term, since he predicts,
the debt levels would not change over the next 100
years, and if need be, taxes could be raised.
Kazumasa Iwata of the Bank of Japan, however,
said that many in Japan feel the pressure to tackle
the debt-to-GDP ratio, since any revenues from
future tax hikes would likely go toward fixing the
problems with the public pension fund system.
Speeches about reforming banks and govern-
ment financial institutions brought about various
ideas and issues, including a still-dour assessment
of the overall situation by University of Chicago 
professor Anil Kashyap. “Japan has been trying
policies that have not worked elsewhere and avoid-
ing the policies that have been effective in other
countries,” he said. A fundamental structural 
problem, noted Takeo Hoshi of the University of
California, San Diego, was the uneven playing field
between private banks and government financial
institutions. Makoto Hosomi of the Financial
Services Agency noted the need for bank manage-
ment to take full responsibility for internal
compliance, while Naoyuki Yoshino of Keio
University worried that unless banks came up with
new ways of making a profit, the road ahead was
bleak and similar to what they went though in the
late 1980s. 
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Director, Center on Japanese
Economy and Business
Columbia Business School
Obviously, I can’t claim tobe an objective, disinter-
ested person as a commentator
because I’ve been deeply inter-
ested in this research project
and certainly have been deeply
interested in the results. When
we set up this project, we were
hoping we would have a gen-
eral consensus and would
accept the fact that each of the
authors would have somewhat
different views on specific
issues. That’s the way it’s been,
and I think the general consen-
sus was that Japan’s major
problem was that it had inade-
quate aggregate demand—and
that’s a major reason for the
deflation and inadequate
growth. At the same time, we
recognize that there are very
important supply-side structural
problems that need to be
addressed directly. We’re talk-
ing about banking here today,
but if you think about it, it’s
certainly true for other sectors
like corporate restructuring and
agriculture. 
You know that every sector
in Japan has problems that
need to be addressed. So let
me first turn to my comments
on monetary policy. I agree
that monetary policy has
improved. It’s not that the
underlying policy of quantita-
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tive easing was changed signifi-
cantly. The amount was
expanded, but it was more or
less along the same rate. What
was really important was the
change in the effort and ability
to affect market expectations
through better communication,
which resulted in a less contra-
dictory sort of story. And I
think trying to define the exit
conditions for when interest
rates will rise has been very
important, though, frankly, I
believe they are still too modest
and vague. The consumer price
index (CPI) has been positive
for some months, and there
isn’t an expectation of defla-
tion. Because of the upward
bias in the CPI index, I think
the Bank of Japan (BoJ) should
be aiming for a one percent tar-
get, with a low expectation that
the rate will go down before it
moves out of the zero interest
rate policy. In that sense, I con-
gratulate the BoJ for not moving
prematurely toward an exit
strategy, and signaling that it
was not going to move out of
the zero interest rate policy any
time soon. I know there are
pressures for it to do so, but I
think it has successfully resisted.
I agree with the policy 
recommendation of first setting
a price-level target and then,
once it’s achieved, setting an
inflation target. In fact, I doubt
that we will see any time soon,
the BoJ adopting an explicit tar-
get. But Japan is a country of
charming vagueness, and the
use of the term “reference
point” as we have employed 
it in the United States can, at
times, be a very strong implicit
target, if indeed that’s what it is.
And so for me, what is impor-
tant is that the bank thinks in
terms of what the reference
point should be. It will proba-
bly not just be a point, but a
range of one to two percent,
something that sort of just hap-
pens in the United States. The
important thing is to provide
sufficient and noncontradictory
information about the policy
makers’ expectations of the
future course of the economy
in order to shape expectations




Professor, Graduate School of
Economics and Research Center
for Advanced Science and
Technology, University of Tokyo
Iwill not defend anybody onthe Japanese side but will try
to go over some of the more
political-economic explanations
about the banking system. 
I agree that Resona Bank
was basically insolvent, and I
also think I was on record say-
ing that Resona shareholders
shouldn’t have been bailed out.
However, the assessment of the
media and of the whole situa-
tion in Japan is quite different
among various parties. Resona
is regarded as a success in
terms of turning around the
banking sector and especially
turning around stock prices.
That, I think, is the reason 
why the bank was bailed out. 
I believe the regulators knew
the true balance sheet, yet they
did not declare that it was
insolvent. Instead, they elected
to nationalize it, which means it
saved the shareholders. At the
time the decision was made,
the stock price was below
8,000 yen, which was one-fifth
of its value from its peak in
1989, and was dropping very
fast. The mood was one of cri-
sis and resulted in a meltdown
in the stock market. I think that
former Financial Services Agency
Minister Heizo Takenaka
thought that if Resona were
declared insolvent, and the
shareholders got nothing, then
the stock market—and espe-
cially the banking sector—
would have a meltdown. So
that’s my guess; I think it was a
political decision to nationalize
Resona instead of declaring it
insolvent. Somehow, stock
prices turned around after the
Resona bailout, including bank
stocks. The stock market got
the message that any banks
holding other bank shares was
still a safe bet. Of course, share-
holders were betrayed in a way
when Resona was declared
insolvent a month later. So in
that sense, one hazard was off-
set by another and so, I don’t
know. I think Minister Takenaka
was praised a lot when stock
prices initially turned around,
and saving Resona was consid-
ered as an ingenious move. 
The situation with Resona
was a political success. How
can I make everyone assess 
the turn of events as being so?
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Let’s say the current situation is
that the banks are still under-
capitalized, the inspection still
lax, and more things have to be
done so that banks can capital-
ize, restructure, incorporate,
and sell their assets. 
Now my sense is that the
inspections have gotten rela-
tively tougher, and I do not
believe that inspection is a
problem. It was a problem three
to five years ago, but I think the
special inspections over the last
two years are good, and the
inspection classification of bad
assets are reasonably accurate.
The problem now is the
restructuring process of failed
corporations. When corpora-
tions fail, banks have to write
off those loans. Even if the loan
reserves are there, the banks’
balance sheets do not change.
How to restructure corporations
is a big problem. Typically, 
they try to merge with another
firm and restructure without 
firing a lot of workers. The reha-
bilitation of the company, rather
than the liquidation, is regarded
as a social responsibility. And
that’s why those assets will not
come to the market through an
auction. 
I can tell you a story about
one U.S. Treasury Secretary
coming to Japan. I was invited
to brief him with other analysts
and professors, and this
Treasury Secretary asked why
corporations don’t sell their
assets through an auction, since
that would be an easy solu-
tion—to liquidate their assets
and maybe solve the problem
in Japan. And I said it wasn’t
that easy, because all the assets
are collateralized. 
I explained that assets have
to be repossessed and put on
the market. But putting these
assets on the market means that
you have to clean up the titles
and rights and evict the tenants,
if necessary. That’s very diffi-
cult to do in Japan. So it may
be easy to say and do that in
the United States, but not in
Japan. But say, for example,
that there was a building or
house that was nonperforming
and you wanted to liquidate
and sell it. But first, you would
have to evict the tenants, and
that would take probably five
years to do. Tenants have very
strong rights, so even if you
have collateral, it’s hard to 
liquidate it. So it’s more of a
legal issue. This situation is
very similar to the one in
Indonesia. When I advised the
Indonesians to liquidate, they
also all said that you couldn’t
easily evict tenants. So there
have to be more legal things
worked out before you can
take necessary actions. 
Q & A SESSION
Answered by Professor Anil
Kashyap, University of Chicago
QUESTION 
Professor Kashyap, accord-ing to official figures,
we’ve had a big reduction of
nonperforming loans held by
the big banks. Is that real, or is
that just a shell game? In some
cases, it was very hard to get
figures of what actually has
happened to the distressed
loans that were written off.
Generally, there’s a sense that
there’s been a reduction in the
level of financial vulnerability
among the biggest banks. Is that
a false impression, or is it true?
ANIL KASHYAP
The situation is now better.It’s been better every year
for the last three or four years,
better than, say, 1999, when
this stuff came out into the
open. But I still think there are
lots of loans the companies
have. If you use standard 
evaluations, just ask what the
present cash flow is from run-
ning this business and compare
that amount to the money they
borrowed. The present value 
is going to be lower than the
amount they borrowed. And 
in that sense, if we did evalua-
tions in that way, those loans
would be recognized as risky,
and the banks would have to
come up with some capital to
make provision for those losses
whenever it is recognized. So I
still think there are many loans
to companies that are scraping
along, making almost zero
profit, can barely repay the
interest, but are never going to
repay the full principal. And
that, exactly, are the hidden
losses. I don’t know what the
size is, but I think tens of tril-
lions of yen are still hidden. 
So 20 trillion yen is still a pretty
reasonable estimate for how
much is needed, if we drop the
“I pretend this loan’s good and
you pretend that I’ve got the
The rehabilitation
of the company 
is regarded 
as a social 
responsibility.
—Takatoshi Ito
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capital to cover it if I needed
to” bomb. If the economy were
to keep growing, you’d make
further progress. Now, the rea-
son I keep harping on these
zombies is that I think you can’t
get growth because the zombies
strangle healthy firms. So, until
you get rid of these companies,
you’re never going to have 
sustained growth. My forecast
for the future hasn’t changed
for the last five years, because
the zombies are still here. 
The minute you get rid of those
guys, I will say we’ll have a
contraction, but then you’ll
have a much sharper, sustained
period of growth. And at that
point, I think you could start to
see good lending opportunities
and a more optimistic scenario.
But you’ve got to take the med-
icine, and it’s going to be painful.
QUESTION
I’m a policymaker in aWestern government. When
you hear statements like “poli-
cymakers just don’t get it,” 
it strikes me as an incredible
assertion of one view over
what might really be happening
within various ministries.
Policymaking is not conducted
to gain the optimum academic
result but is, rather, a political
exercise, and therefore people
have to be essentially paid off
and other interests have to be
attended to, and it’s never
clean. I don’t wish to be over-
critical, because in economic
terms you may well be right,
but Japan has made tremen-
dous progress with just setting
up something like the Financial
Supervisory Agency (FSA),
which would have been
unthinkable at one time. There
are a whole lot of things that
have to be consolidated if you
want to have your sort of
model of the world replicated,
or at least reflected in Japan.
It’s a different country. So there
are different norms and differ-
ent values by which things
happen, and that includes 
policy and economics. 
ANIL KASHYAP
Let me say two things. Firstof all, I don’t think the laws
of economics differ anywhere
in the world. You can go back
to villages in 1550, and there
was basic supply and demand.
And yes, part of the reason
why I got to this point is
because there is no accounta-
bility in the policymaking
process. No one is going to 
be held accountable for giving
away all of that taxpayer
money to Resona. So it’s true
that these things would be
painful and difficult, and the
person who implements them
is probably going to get fired.
But we’ve tried delaying things.
It hasn’t worked, and every
time you think that things are
getting better, you have another
thing like Resona that’s just
completely outrageous. The 
difference between Japan and
the United States is that Charles
Keating is in every money and
banking textbook as the villain
of the S&L crisis. The mystery
about all of this in the financial
system is that there’s no face or
name or anything. It just has
happened. Trillions of yen,
hundreds of trillions of yen
have been spent, and there’s
no accountability in the system.
Maybe it is counterproductive
to be so aggressive, but I think
trying to be polite and diplo-
matic allows them to dissemble
and just change the subject and
not confront these things.
There are plenty of other peo-
ple who are being much more
polite about giving this advice,
but my view is proving to be
right. Ignoring this hasn’t
helped, and I don’t think it’s








Let me give you a little bit ofbackground on my project.
It started a few years ago, in
late 2000 to early 2003; the U.S.
economy was really struggling
to recover from a very sharp
recession, despite some very
expansionary monetary and fis-
cal policies. A lot of us at the
Federal Reserve started worry-
ing that a chronic Japan-style
deflation, or at least stagnation,
seemed quite possible. In fact,
an early version of this presen-
tation was entitled, “Will the
U.S. Become the Next Japan?” 
Well, things have changed a
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this project, and by late 2004,
the U.S. economy seems to
have turned the corner. There
remain some reservations about
fiscal problems and employ-
ment growth. But there has
definitely been a turnaround 
in the U.S. economy, whereas
Japan’s recovery still seems to
be tenuous or fragile, at best.
So the basic question that we
pose in this paper and in this
presentation is why the United
States did not, in 2002 and
2003, become the next Japan.
Why did we turn the corner,
whereas Japan still seems to
struggle to get some traction? 
Let me first take you back
to the 2002–2003 time period,
when a lot of us were really
worried about the U.S. econ-
omy. One of the reasons we
were worrying so much was
that when you compared the
broad macroeconomic outlines
of what was going on in the
United States with what was
going on in Japan, you saw
some really eerie or striking
similarities.
If you simply look at the
chart for gross domestic prod-
uct growth (see Table A), you
see that for both the United
States and Japan, the recession
was preceded by a period of
very, very robust growth.
Growth in excess of 4, 5, or 6
percent for both Japan and the
United States, followed by a
very severe drop-off in terms 
of GDP growth, and a rebound
for both countries. The U.S.
rebound came a little bit sooner
than Japan’s, but they both had
a rebound after two to maybe
five years. And the top solid
line is where the data stops for
the United States. Hopefully,
that rebound will continue. And 
we all know that in the case 
of Japan, the rebound was 
followed by a relapse into a
continued recession. 
If you look a little bit into
the numbers in a slightly more
disaggregate level, you’ll find
that both the expansion and
subsequent recession in Japan
and the United States were 
primarily investment driven
(see Table B). 
So the solid and dotted
lines represent the overall tra-
jectory of GDP, lined up so that
the peaks of both economies
are at the number zero and are
then normalized, so that the
peak is equal to 100 at that
peak year. These lines show
the path of GDP, whereas the
two thin lines with the dots
show the path of investment.
As you see in both cases, the
expansion was driven by very,









TA B L E  A
TA B L E  B
November 19, 2004 7
recession, or the contraction in
the economy, in both cases was
driven by a very severe invest-
ment contraction. In the United
States, there was a lot of worry-
ing and hand-wringing about
the investment overhang, and
the same thing was going on 
in Japan, of course.
With regard to fiscal policy,
again, the parallels are eerie
(see Table C). Both countries
went from a surplus in the
neighborhood of 3 to 4 percent
of GDP to swinging very rap-
idly down to deficits. In the
United States, the deficit was
running about 3 percent of
GDP. If you look in a slightly
different way and plot in the
change of the structural deficit
as a measure of fiscal impulse,
both economies were roughly
in a neutral fiscal policy. Maybe
the United States had a slight
contractual fiscal policy. In the
years prior to the peak, both
countries experienced positive
structural deficits immediately
following the peak. 
In both cases, in terms of
monetary policy, there’s a
superficial similarity. Interest
rates rose before the peak and
then fell sharply. So on the sur-
face, monetary policy looked 
as if it was doing roughly the
same thing.
There were, however, some
very important differences. Or
maybe the similarities were
superficial, because when you
dig a little deeper, they don’t
appear to be quite so similar.
One notable similarity, and yet
also a difference, is the case 
of equity prices (see Table D).
Both countries, in retrospect,
seem to have experienced an
equity-price bubble. The main
difference is that the bubble in
the case of Japan was much
larger in magnitude. We nor-
malized the chart so that the
stock market peak, or the stock
market value at the GDP peak,
is equal to 100. You see that
the Japanese stock market rose
about 50 or 60 percent more
than that in the United States,
or 400 to 500 points prior to the
GDP peak. Interestingly, the
Japanese stock market peak
also came a number of quarters
prior to the GDP peak, while it
was roughly coincidental in the
case of the United States. So,
the equity bubble is smaller
and more delayed in the case
of the United States when it is
compared to Japan. 
Housing has been the 
subject of a great deal of dis-
cussion (see Table E). 
Surprisingly, housing prices
were—for all intents and pur-
poses—flat during the ten years
The bubble in the
case of Japan 
was much larger 
in magnitude.
—Kenneth Kuttner
TA B L E  C
TA B L E  D
8 Solutions for Japan’s Economic Problems: Implications for U.S.-Japan Relations
The Japanese inflation rate,
however, had a very pro-
nounced increase over the
period running up to the peak.
And then, as we all know, it
had a very steady march down-
ward into the deflationary
range about four years after the
business cycle peak. So this has
important business implications
on how we assess the stance of
monetary policy. 
Now, I’d like to focus a 
little more specifically on mon-
etary policy. I would like to
compare the Bank of Japan’s
policy actions immediately fol-
lowing the recession with those
that the Fed followed to try to
discern any differences in the
way policy was conducted in
the two countries. 
I’ll make this comparison in
two parts. Part one is a compar-
ison of what happened in the
three, or maybe four years after
the peak of the business cycle.
For Japan, this would corre-
prior to the business cycle 
peak in the United States. And
although there has been some
discussion of a bubble in U.S.
housing prices in recent years,
that has all come since the
peak of the business cycle. 
You see a bit of a run-up in the
Repeat Sales Index. A lot of
that seems to be due to the
increasing quality of houses. 
So if you make that quality
adjustment, the run-up in real
estate prices seems to be much
smaller. To that extent, there
seems to be very little evidence
of any sort of a bubble, surpris-
ingly, in U.S. home prices. 
And then, coming back to
the fiscal situation, what’s inter-
esting to note is the net debt
ratio to GDP. In terms of net
debt, the Japanese fiscal situa-
tion since its peak year looked
very good with a net debt ratio
to GDP of only slightly in the
excess of 10 percent. But the
United States started in a posi-
tion of much higher debt levels.
Of course, the United States
might be shooting off to a net
debt ratio comparable to that in
Japan if we aren’t careful. But
in terms of the initial condition,
it’s interesting to note that
Japan seemed to have much
more room to maneuver its
respective fiscal policy than the
United States did with regard to
net debt ratio.
And then, finally, in terms
of inflation, there’s a very strik-
ing similarity, which plays into
how we assess respective mon-
etary policy (see Table F). 
Inflation in the United
States remained relatively stable
between the one-and-a-half to
two percent range. 
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spond to the period from mid-
1991 to 1994. It was a period of
collapse, recovery, and then a
relapse. For the United States,
this would cover the period
from 2001 through early- to
mid-2004. It was a period of
collapse, low recovery, and no
relapse as of yet. Although the
policies of both countries were
superficially similar, once we
dig a little deeper, we find out
that the Fed’s policy was quite
a bit more decisive than the
BoJ during this episode.
The second part of the
comparison is a little difficult.
This would be the period
beyond the four years after the
peak of the business cycle. For
Japan, that would correspond
to 1995 through the present.
The economy was battling
mild, but chronic, deflation.
The problem is that we have
no comparable experience for
the Fed, since the cycle had
more or less turned the corner
economically. So we’re left with
some speculation about what
the Fed might have done had
the deflationary, or near defla-
tionary, conditions persisted. 
So, the first important
dimension where the two poli-
cies differed has to do with 
the path of real interest rates. 
If you’ve taken Economics 101,
you know that the nominal
interest rate is not the relevant
measure of expansionary or
contractive monetary policy.
What you really ought to be
looking at is the real rate that
affects consumption and invest-
ment decisions. I subtracted the
inflation rate from the nominal
overnight interest rate over the
previous four quarters, so the
lag inflation rate becomes a
proxy for the real interest rate.
And what you see if you do
this is that in Japan, even
though nominal interest rates
were cut sharply, because the
inflation rate was also falling,
the decline in real interest rates
was much more modest—and
in fact ceased about one year
following the peak of GDP. So
after about 1992, real interest
rates remained pretty constant
at about 3 percent—not partic-
ularly an expansionary
monetary policy, and maybe
neutral, at best. 
On the other hand, the
United States rate cuts were
very aggressive (see Table G). 
But because inflation
remained relatively stable, it
corresponded to a very sharp
decrease in real interest rates.
So about one year after the
peak, the real interest rate took
a hit, bottomed out at about
zero, and even dipped slightly
into the negative for about two
years. Now, we can also get
into a lot of discussion about
whether this proxy for the real
interest rate based on lagged
inflation is legitimate or not,
because what you really ought
to be looking at would be the
expectations of future inflation.
So, depending on whether the
deflation or disinflation was
expected or not, you can get 
a slightly different picture. 
What I tried to show in the
next chart is what the BoJ did
with interest rates to what the
Fed might have done if it had
been faced with economic con-
ditions like those in Japan (see
Table H). 
Of course we’ll never
know, and this is a chart that
shows bizarre counterfactuals
that you never really know the
answer to, but we try the best
we can as macroeconomists. 
The solid line is the actual
call rate, and the thin line with
the circles shows the “normal”
policy response of the BoJ
using its past behavior as a
template, estimating an equa-
tion for this past behavior. And
what you can see is that the
TA B L E  G
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actual response of the BoJ 
was pretty much in line with 
its normal response, or what 
it would have done. Maybe it
lagged a little with easing in
1993, but then it’s not a huge
gap between what it did and
what it would normally have
done. 
Now, what the thin line
with the squares shows is what
the Fed might have done if
faced with the conditions in
Japan. How do we get that? We
estimated a reaction function,
or a so-called “instrument rule”
for the Fed, and then plugged
the variables that go into that
equation for Japan. So we
plugged in the Japanese infla-
tion rate and GDP growth 
and found that if the BoJ had
reacted to conditions as the Fed
might have, had it been faced
with the same situation, there
would have actually been much
sharper rate cuts in that crucial
period of 1992 to 1993. And in
fact, that zero nominal interest
rate would have been hit in late
1992, whereas the BoJ did not
hit zero until many years after
that. So, again, this basically
illustrates the point that the
Fed’s reaction to economic con-
ditions really would have been
much more aggressive during
this period. And just to check
on whether this result was
plausible, we went back and
looked at the Fed’s behavior
using the same kind of compar-
ison (see Table I). 
The line with the diamonds
shows what the Fed actually
did during this period. This 
historically-estimated equation
estimates a so-called “normal
policy.” 
The second phase of the
comparison is post-1994. Just to
summarize, we had rate cuts,
and nothing much happened.
We had the zero interest rate
policy. We had the end of the
zero interest rate policy. In
August 2000, we had the
restoration of the zero interest
rate policy, plus a qualitative
easing, and a quantitative eas-
ing in March 2001. The big
caveats at the end of this are
the statements by BoJ officials.
As constructive as the quantita-
tive easing policy and the zero
interest rate policy might have
been, the official statements
from the BoJ often undercut
this commitment to expansion-
ary monetary policy. Officials
repeatedly said that we were
going to undo this as soon as
we could, or inflation was still
a danger we needed to watch
out for, and so on and so forth. 
Now we have to use a little
imagination when comparing
TA B L E  H
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what the Fed might have done.
Recall to the period of 2002
and 2003. There was a lot of
concern about a Japanese-style
situation, but we eventually
dodged that bullet, so we will
never know what would have
happened. But at the time, it’s
important to note that aggres-
sive, antideflationary measures
were actively discussed by
high-ranking Fed officials, by
people like Ben Bernanke and
Alan Greenspan. Virtually every
member of the Fed was saying
something on this topic. The
kinds of things that they were
discussing included long-term
interest rate caps, purchases of
securities other than treasuries,
quantitative measures, even
operations and the options
market. Who knows whether
they would have actually done
these things. But these were all
being discussed, and perhaps it
was a commitment to a future
interest rate pass, a commit-
ment that would hold interest
rates low for a long period of
time. And the kind of state-
ments that you heard included
Bernanke’s speech in November
2002 that said, quite forcefully,
that the Fed would be far from
helpless in the face of deflation
should the Federal Funds rate
hit zero. Contrast that with
some of the BoJ statements,
which repeatedly said things
were hopeless and that there
was nothing it could do once
rates hit that point. A key 
turning point came in a May
2003 statement that actually
acknowledged that it was
uncomfortable with an inflation
rate that was that low and 
preferred an increase in the
inflation rate. Probably an
unwelcome and substantial fall
in inflation exceeds the peak 
of an inflation. So this set a
lower boundary on the comfort
zone. And then, in a step that 
is perhaps tantamount to
declaring a cap to the interest
rate, the BoJ announced that its
accommodating policy would
be maintained for a consider-
able period of time, the famous
“considerable period of time”
statement. 
So, in conclusion, there
were some eerie macroeco-
nomic parallels: an abrupt GDP
deceleration; investment col-
lapse; deterioration of fiscal
situations and monetary policy
that was, at least, superficially
similar. But there were some
critical differences, and we will
have no way of knowing which
of these was decisive . . . or
maybe they were all decisive
collectively. But in any case,
working in favor of the United
States included the less bubbly
situation, the stronger financial
system, and the stable inflation
rate. Interestingly enough, a
weaker initial fiscal position
arguably worked against the
United States’s ability to get out
of its brush with deflation. But
in terms of BoJ and Fed poli-
cies, the rapid disinflation in
Japan led to higher real interest
rates than were warranted. The
Fed’s actions suggest a strong
response to real output, and,
unlike the BoJ, the main differ-
ence was the kind of factuals
that the Fed was taking into
account, such as what was
going on with real GDP and
not just inflation. And the Fed’s
actions and its talk as it con-
templated these antideflationary
measures do suggest that it will
benefit from the BoJ’s missteps.
The Fed learned to get out
there early to float these uncon-
ventional policy proposals. It
understood that it was essential
to think about the impact of its
statements on expectations and
recognize the effectiveness of
that policy. I think this is really
a major lesson that Fed officials
picked up from the missteps by
the BoJ. The one thing the Fed
failed to do was to have an
inflation target. And many
economists in and outside the
Fed believed that would have
been the one additional thing
the Fed might have, and should
have, taken into context. So
maybe it didn’t learn all the 
lessons it could have. I think
there is some evidence that the
BoJ also learned from its own
steps over time. And the BoJ
also learned from the policy
discussions surrounding the
Fed’s brush with deflation,
about emphasizing things such
as its expectations, and clarify-
ing the duration of its policy
commitments. 
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